PRAT III

CHIEF CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISPUTE

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　Having considered the principal features of the dispute, the Assembly has reached, in particular, the following conclusions and noted the following facts:

1. The dispute between China and Japan which is submitted to the Assembly originated in Manchuria, which China and foreign Powers have always regarded as an integral part of China under Chinese sovereignty. In its observations on the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Japanese Government contests the argument that the rights conferred on Russia and subsequently acquired by Japan “in the extremely limited area known as the Southern Manchuria Railway zone” conflict with Chinese sovereignty. “They were, on the contrary, derived from the sovereignty of China.”
   The rights conferred by China on Russia and subsequently on Japan derive from the sovereignty of China. Under the Treaty of Pekin in 1905, “the Imperial Chinese Government consented to all the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan” under the Treaty of Portsmouth. In 1915, it was to China that Japan addressed demands for the extension of her rights in Manchuria and it was with the Government of the Chinese Republic that, following on these demands, the Treaty of May 25th, 1915, was concluded concerning South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. At the Washington Conference, the Japanese delegation stated, on February 2nd, 1922, that Japan renounced certain preferential rights in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and explained that, “in coming to this decision, Japan had been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China’s sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity.” The Nine-Power Treaty, concluded at the Washington Conference, applies to Manchuria as to every other part of China. Finally, during the first phase of the present conflict, Japan never argued that Manchuria was not an integral part of China.
2. Past experience shows that those who control Manchuria exercise a considerable influence on the affairs of the rest of China—at least of North China—and possess unquestionable strategic and political advantages. To cut off these provinces from the rest of China cannot but create a serious irredentist problem likely to endanger peace.
3. The Assembly, in noting these facts, is not unmindful of the tradition of autonomy existing in Manchuria. That tradition, in one extreme case, and in a period of particular weakness on the part of the Central Government of China, made it possible, for instance, for the plenipotentiaries of Marshal Chang Tso-lin to conclude, in the name of the “Government of the autonomous three Eastern Provinces of the Republic of China,” the agreement of September 20th, 1924, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, navigation, the delimitation of frontiers, etc. It is obvious from the provisions of that agreement, however, that the Government of the autonomous three Eastern Provinces did not regard itself as the Government of a State independent of China, but believed that it might itself negotiate with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on questions affecting the interests of China in the three provinces, though the Central Government had, a few months previously, concluded an agreement on these questions with the self-same Power.
   　This autonomy of Manchuria was also shown by the fact that, first, Marshal Chang Tso-lin and later Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang were the heads both of the civil and military administration and exercised the effective power in the three provinces through their armies and their officials. The independence proclaimed by Marshal Chang Tso-lin at different times never meant that either he or the people of Manchuria wished to be separated from China. His armies did not invade China as if it were a foreign country but merely as participants in the civil war. Through all its wars and periods of “independence,” Manchuria remained an integral part of China. Further, since 1928, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang has recognised the authority of the Chinese National Government.

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　The situation which led up to the events of September 18th, 1931, presents certain special features. It was subsequently aggravated by the development of the Japanese military operations, the creation of the “Manchukuo Government” and the recognition of that “Government” by Japan. Undoubtedly the present case is not that of a country which has declared war on another country without previously exhausting the opportunities for conciliation provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations; neither is it a simple case of the violation of the frontier of one country by the armed forces of a neighbouring country, because in Manchuria, as shown by the circumstances noted above, there are many features without an exact parallel in other parts of the world. It is, however, indisputable that, without any declaration of war, a large part of Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by Japanese troops and that, in consequence of this operation, it has been separated from and declared independent of the rest of China.

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　While at the origin of the state of tension that existed before September 18th, 1931, certain responsibilities would appear to lie on one side and the other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for the development of events since September 18th, 1931.

PART IV

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THE ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDS AS FOLLOWS:

1. Whereas the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China,
   　A. Considering that the presence of Japanese troops outside the zone of the South Manchuria Railway and their operations outside this zone are incompatible with the legal principles which should govern the settlement of the dispute, and that it is necessary to establish as soon as possible a situation consistent with these principles,
   　The Assembly recommends the evacuation of these troops. In view of the special circumstances of the case, the first object of the negotiations recommended hereinafter should be to organise this evacuation and to determine the methods, stages and time-limits thereof.